In Asten Johnson, Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co., Inc., 562 F.3d 213 (3rd Cir. 2009), a manufacturer of asbestos dryer felt sought coverage under a CGL policy for claims related to asbestos exposure. The insurers interposed an exclusion for losses alleging “an exposure to or the contracting of asbestosis or any liability resulting therefore.” Asten rather literally contended that the exclusion applied only to liability to a person who alleged that he was harmed by being exposed to a person who suffered from asbestosis. 562 F.3d at 219-20. The court rejected this argument, finding the exclusion ambiguous. Therefore, under Pennsylvania law, parol evidence is admissible in the interpretation of written, integrated contracts where an interpretation of a contract “in light of any evidence of trade usage in the performance of the parties,” the “intent of the parties remains unclear.” 562 F.3d at 220.

The court found no fault in the district court’s conclusion that the term “asbestosis” “was used to mean the specific asbestos-related disease” and that “it was used as a generic term . . . that includes all asbestos-related diseases.” Id. The court further adopted the district court’s conclusion that the evidence “clearly demonstrates that Asten understood and intended the Asbestosis Exclusion to bar all claims alleging any asbestos-related disease.” Id. (emphasis in original). On this basis, the court rejected Asten’s argument that the exclusion extended only to “exposure to the risk of contracting asbestosis.” Id. at 221.